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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent~ 
vs. 
LESLIE D. P APP ACOSTAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF· 
Case No. 
10234 
STATEMENT OF 'l,HE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Leslie D. Pappacostas, appeals 
from a conviction for the crime of grand larceny upon 
jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with grand larceny and 
second degree burglary. Prior to trial a motion to 
3 
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suppress certain evidence was made on the basis of an 
alleged illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied 
the motion to suppress. '!"he jury returned a verdict 
of guilty to the charge of grand larceny, and the appel-
lant was committed to the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMEN'l, OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement 
of facts as being a more accurate statement of the evi-
dence received at trial. 
On January 6, 1964, Pehrson's Hardware Store 
in Salt Lake City closed as usual at 6:00p.m. (T. 29). 
On January 7, 1964, when an employee opened the 
store, he noted holes in the wall, that boxes which had 
contained guns were opened and empty, and that the 
store was generally "torn up" (T. 31, 32). 
Mr. Paul Pehrson, the store owner, noted that $88, 
a Land camera, $5 in stamps, and 15 to 18 guns were 
missing. Exhibit 1, a .357 Magnum pistol, was identified 
as one of the missing guns (T. 39}. Although Mr. 
Pehrson had no personal knowledge of whether the 
gun had been stolen or sold by an employee, his busi· 
4 
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• 
ness records showed that the gun was not sold and was 
not properly taken from the store (T. 46, 49, 77-84). 
On January 10, 1964, three days after the larceny, 
Officer William Litton of the Las Vegas Police De-
partment was alerted to be on the lookout for a 1963 
Ford having Utah license plates which had been recent-
ly changed ( T. 60) . Officer Litton observed the vehicle 
pull into a service station in Las Vegas. He approached 
the vehicle's driver and asked if he could see his driver's 
license and registration (T. 60, 61). The owner of 
the vehicle was a Mr. Bates Anderson, the driver. As 
Mr. Anderson opened the console between the front 
seats to get his registration, Officer Litton noticed 
a .22 caliber pistol (T. 62). He ordered the four occu-
pants in the car to get out (T. 62). The defendant 
was in the right front seat immediately in back of the 
glove compartment (T. 61). Officer Litton put all 
parties under arrest and searched the vehicle ( T. 61 ) . 
He found several other guns in the glove compartment, 
including a .357 Mangum pistol, the serial number 
of which matched the serial number of the gun taken 
from Pehrson's store (T. 54, 63). The license plates 
on the vehicle were not those for which the vehicle 
was registered .(T. 86, 87). Burglary tools were also 
found (T. 66). 
The appellant, Leslie Pappacostas, was questioned 
concerning the .357 magnum and told the Las Vegas 
police that the gun belonged to him (T. 74), that he 
had purchased the weapon several months previous in 
5 
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a bar, and had brought it with him to Nevada (T. 86-
87). The gun was valued at $115 (T. 39). 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION. 
The appellant contends that the evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain the conviction for grand larceny. 
It is submitted that there is no merit to the appellant's 
position when the evidence is viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. 
The record discloses that on January 6, 1964, 
numerous items of property were apparently taken 
from Pehrson's Hardware in Salt Lake City. The 
evidence relating to the taking of this property shows 
that the store was secured for the night and that in the 
morning $88 cash, $5 in stamps, a Land camera, and 
fifteen to eighteen guns had been taken. A hole had 
apparently been opened in the roof or wall. According 
to the records kept in the regular course of business 
by the Pehrson Hardware store, a .357 magnum pistol 
(Exhibit I ) had been taken from the store. No record 
of any kind disclosed that the pistol had been sold 
and Mr. Pehrson, who kept reasonable control over 
6 
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the store, was of the opinion that the item had been 
illegally removed from his store. 
Three days later the item was recovered from the 
glove compartment of a motor vehicle in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, in which the appellant was riding as an occu-
pant. Burglary tools were also recovered. The appel-
lant admitted that the P.istol was his and claimed that 
he had purchased it approximately two months previous 
and had it in his possession when he went to Nevada. 
Under thes circumstances, it is submitted that the 
evidence more than satisfies the requirements to sus-
tain a conviction of grand larceny. 
There is no evidence that other persons stole the 
property and in State v. Gillespie~ 117 Utah 114, 213 
P.2d 353, this court observed that under the provisions 
of Section 76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the 
only elements the State need establish for the crime 
of larceny are recently stolen property in the possession 
of the defendant and an unsatisfactory explanation 
of the possession. It is apparent that all the elements 
of the crime are present in this case. The evidence 
discloses sufficient circumstances to support a belief 
that the .357 magnum pistol was taken from Pehrson's 
on the· night of January· 6, 1964. The property was 
admittedly in the possession of the appellant some three 
days subsequent to the burglary and he admitted 
taking the pistol to Nevada. By his own admission, 
the recent possession of stolen property is established. 
The fact that at the time he was apprehended he did 
not have the pistol on his person is of no consequence 
7 
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in view of his admission that he had the pistol and his 
claim of ownership. Further, the appellant's statement 
that he had purchased the pistol in a bar two months 
previous to his arrest is obviously an unsatisfactory 
explanation of the possession and, therefore, evidence 
of the appellant's guilt. 
The appellant's contention that the evidence is in-
sufficient to show that the pistol had been taken from 
Pehrson's Hardware does not bear up under analysis. 
Mr. Pehrson himself testified that the gun was taken 
from his shop. He indicated that he kept close control 
over his gun inventory and that in his opinion the gun 
was not sold. Further, a record check of his inventory 
records disclosed that the pistol had not been sold. 
The preceding evidence, when coupled with the obvious 
evidence of a larcenous taking on January 6 or 7, 
1964, and the defendant's unsatisfactory explanation 
of his possession of the pistol is sufficient to sustain 
the conviction of larceny. State v ..... 4llred_, 16 U.2d 41, 
395 P.2d 535 (1964); State v. Cappas_, 100 Utah 274, 
114 P.2d 205. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GIVING INS'TRUCTION NO. 6, AND THE 
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM ERROR IN 
THE INSTRUCTIONS SINCE APPROPRI-
ATE EXCEPTIONS 'VERE NO'l, TAKEN. 
8 
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The appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in giving its Instruction No. 6 and in failing to give 
appellant's requested instruction on possession of re-
t centely stolen property. It is submitted that appellant 
has· not preserved the issue on appeal. At the time 
for taking exceptions, counsel merely stated (T. 95): 
"At this time, your Honor, the defendant 
takes exceptions to the judge's instructions to 
the jury in this matter, on the grounds that it 
fails to correctly state the law, is contrary to 
the evidence - more particularly, in that the 
judge denied the defendant's requested Instruc-
tions Numbers I, 2, and 3. Submitted, your 
Honor." 
It is well settled that a general exception to in-
structions to the jury is insufficient to raise any question 
on appeal. State v. King~ 24 Utah 482, 68 Pac. 418; 
State v. Campbell~ 25 Utah 342, 71 Pac. 529; State 
v. Judd~ 74 Utah 398, 279 Pac. 953. In State v. Woods~ 
62 Utah 397, 220 Pac. 215 (1923), this court observed, 
with reference to the general exception or objection 
similar to that in the instant case: 
" * * * With some slight variations the ob-
jection interposed by counsel in each instance 
was, 'I object to the remarks of the district 
attorney and assign it as prejudicial error,' or 
'I except to the remarks of counsel and assign 
it as prejudicial error.' This sort of objection 
or exception, without anything further, without 
a proper request for instructions to the jury 
and a ruling by the court, and an exception 
reserved at the proper time, presents nothing 
for review on appeal." 
9 
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At the time of taking exceptions, counsel did 
nothing which would alert the court as to the defects 
which are now claimed on appeal. The function of an 
exception is, in part, to bring to the court's attention 
specific claims wherein an instruction may be deficient 
so that it may be corrected and the jury properly ap-
prised. Since counsel did not see fit to indicate to the 
court with any particularity wherein he felt that In-
struction No. 6 given by the court was deficient, that 
instruction cannot be challenged for the first time on 
appeal, in the absence of a showing that such an instruc-
tion totally deprived the appellant of a fair trial or 
was palpably erroneous. State v. Cobo., 90 Utah 89, 
60 P.2d 952 {1936). 
It is submitted that the instruction as given by 
the court properly apprised the jury of the elements 
of the crime of larceny and was not prejudicial. In-
struction No. 6 must be read in conjunction with 
Instruction No. 5, 'vhich enumerated the specific 
elements of the crime of larceny (R. 5). Instruction 
No. 5 advised the jury that larceny was the felonious 
stealing, taking, or carrying away of the personal prop-
erty of another. This is the specific language of Section 
76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Further, the 
court explained each of the elements for the crime of 
grand larceny and advised the jury that they must 
find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Instruction No. 6, as given by the court, covers the 
last sentence of Section 76-38-1, Utah Code Anno· 
tated, 1953, which makes possession of property re· 
10 
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cently stolen evidence of guilt. The appellant com-
plains that the instruction as given was defective in 
two facets: first, that the statement preliminary to the 
instruction, that the definition of larceny includes the 
concept of possession of recently stolen property, was 
prejudicially erroneous; and, second, that the instruc-
tion somehow does ,not advise the jury that recent 
possession was an evidentiary fact to be considered by 
them in determining the appellant's guilt. 
The second contention is obviously without merit, 
since the instruction itself advises the jury that the 
possession of recently stolen property is only a pre-
sumption which can be rebutted by other evidence. 
Further, the instruction advises the jury that the 
possession must be of property "recently stolen" and 
that there must be a failure to make a "satisfactory 
explanation" of the possession. The instruction as 
given was completely in accord with the decision of this 
court in State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228, 
and sets forth adequately the rule recognized by this 
court in State v. Gillespie~ supra, and State v. Allred~ 
supra, that possession of recently stolen property, with-
out a satisfactory explanation of the possession, is 
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of 
guilt. 
The appellant also seems to argue that the instruc-
tion should have encompassed the language in the 
requested instruction that the possession be conscious, 
exclusive and unexplained. It is submitted that the 
11 
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instruction clearly encompasses these elements since 
the court's instruction refers to the necessity of satis-
factory explanation and to the necessity of the property 
being recently stolen. Further, Instruction No. 5 
required the jury to find knowledge on the part of the 
appellant. It should be noted, however, that no decision 
of this court has ever required a jury to be instructed 
that the possession must be conscious and exclusive. 
State v. Butterfield~ 70 Utah 529, 261 Pac. 804, and 
State v. l(insey_, 77 Utah 348, 295 Pac. 247, merely 
recognize that consciousness and exclusivity are factors 
to be considered in weighing the sufficiency of the 
evidence. This court has recognized that possession 
may be joint possession. State v. Dyett, 114 Utah 379, 
199 P.2d 155. Thus, the term "exclusive" does not 
refer to individual possession. The statement in appel-
lant's brief, that the jury, had it been so instructed 
that the possession required was exclusive, could well 
have found that the possession in the glove compart-
ment nonexclusive, points up the error in appellant's 
argument. First, it overlooks the admissions of the 
appellant which reflect exclusive possession and, sec-
ondly, it evidences the failure to recognize that the 
possession could have been joint in an appropriate 
case. In this case the admissions establish the appellant's 
possession and the fact that the gun, when recovered, 
was in a glove compartment of an automobile in which 
others were riding is immaterial. 
The appellant's additional argument, that the 
reference to recent possession as being part of the 
12 
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definition of larceny was prejudicial, is equally without 
merit. Section 76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which contains the definition of the term larceny, also 
contains the reference to possession of recently stolen 
property. App~llant argues that referring to this aspect 
of the law of larceny as part of the definition of the 
crime of larceny would allow the jury to convict without 
a finding that there had been a taking. This is obvi-
ously absurd. First, the court instructed the jury on 
the requirement of finding a "taking" in Instruction 
No. 5 and also on the other elements making up the 
crime of larceny. Instruction No. 6 uses the word 
"includes" which simply means that this is an additional 
aspect of the law of larceny to that already instructed 
upon. Therefore, in order to convict, the jury was 
instructed that it would have to find the elements in 
Instruction No. 5 and the recent possession elements 
in Instruction No. 6, since they were also included as 
a necessary part of the crime of larceny in the case. 
This court has consistently ruled that instructions should 
be looked at as a whole. State v. Hendricks~ 123 Utah 
267, 258 P.2d 452; State v. Evans~ 107 Utah I, 151 
P.2d 196; State v. Siddoway~ 61 Utah 189, 211 Pac. 
968. When Instruction No. 6 is viewed with Instruc-
tion No. 5 and the other instructions given in the case, 
along with the posture of the evidence, it is apparent 
that the jury was not misled. In State v. Donovan) 
77 Utah 343, 294 Pac. 1108, and State v. Crowder~ 
114 Utah 202, 197 P.2d 917, this court held the sub-
stance of instructions similar to that given in the instant 
13 
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case not to be prejudicial. It is apparent that no preju-
dice resulted from the instruction as given. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
ON THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT EVI-
DENCE WAS OBTAINED AS THE RESULT 
OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
The appellant's contention that the .357 magnum 
pistol was obtained as a result of an illegal search and 
seizure is plainly erroneous. Taking the facts appar-
ently found by the trial court, it appears that Officer 
Litton of the Las Vegas Police Department was 
alerted by reliable information communicated through 
police channels, to be on the lookout for a 1963 black 
Ford having Utah license plates that had been recently 
changed ( T. 60) . Officer Litton observed the motor 
vehicle pull into a service station in Las Vegas. He 
walked up to the driver's side of the car and asked 
Bates Anderson, the operator and owner, for his reg-
istration. When Mr. Anderson opened the console of 
the vehicle, the officer observed a .22 caliber pistol, 
which was loaded. The registration for the vehicle did 
not match the license plates on the vehicle. After 
observing the pistol in the glove compartment, Officer 
Litton instructed the occupants to get out of the car 
and he placed the1n under arrest. Bates Anderson, 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the owner of the vehicle, was placed under arrest. There-
after, a search of the vehicle was made. During the 
search of the vehicle, the .357 magnum pistol was dis-
covered. It is apparent that the search was made inci-
dent to a valid arrest, the valid arrest being of the 
person of Bates Anderson, the driver and owner of the 
vehicle. 
Las Vegas City Ordinances, 1960, Title 6, Chapter 
3, Section 7, prohibits an owner or operator of a motor 
vehicle from carrying any concealed weapons in the 
vehicle. When Officer Litton approached the car, he 
immediately requested the registration. He did not 
place any of the occupants under arrest. Upon observ-
ing the pistol in the console, a crime was committed 
in his presence, and the arrest proper. 
Section 482.275, Nevada Revised Statutes, requires 
that the license plates issued for a motor vehicle be 
attached to the automobile. In the instant case, the 
license plates issued for the instant vehicle were not 
those on the vehicle. Thus, another misdemeanor was 
being committed in the presence of the officer. The 
officer could validly arrest the driver of the vehicle and 
search for any weapon or other contraband. 
In State v. Dodge, 12 U.2d 293, 364 P.2d 798 
(1961), this court ruled that a search incident to an 
arrest was valid where the motor vehicle was being 
operated with plates other than those for which it was 
registered, in violation of Section 41-1-142 (c), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. This court ruled the search 
15 
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incident to an arrest by the officer was proper. 1 There-
fore the Dodge case was precedent for the finding in 
the instant case that the search was incident to a valid 
arrest. 
It is apparent that the arr~t of Bates Anderson, 
for carrying a concealed weapon, was a valid arrest. 
The officer did not arrest Anderson prior to asking 
for his registration, nor did he search the vehicle. When 
Anderson opened the console, the officer saw the 
weapon which was plain to view and observed an offense 
being committed in his presence. 
In Campbell v. United States_, 289 F.2d 775 (D.C. 
Cir. 1961), Mr. Justice Burton of the United States 
Supreme Court, sitting with the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court, considered a case where officers noted 
an automobile standing with its lights out and motor 
II' 
running in Washington, D.C. The officer approached 
the vehicle and asked the driver if he knew his lights 
were out. The driver turned on his lights and the officer 
asked the driver to show them his license and registra-
tion. As the driver opened the door to show the officers 
his registration, the light disclosed clothing and other 
property apparently the subject of a larceny. The 
court in an opinion by Justice Burton ruled that the 
officers at that moment had probable cause and the 
subsequent arrest and search were valid. See also Rob-
inson v. United States_, 283 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
Iln the Dodge case, the office1· made an arrest for a crime other 
than that committed in his presence; but, since a crime was 
being committed in his presence, the arrest was proper irrespec-
tive of the offense for ,,rhich the officer thought he was arresting 
the individual. 
16 
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In Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 
1948), officers observed the appellant and another man 
pull away from the curb of a food store with their car 
lights out. The officers stopped the vehicle and asked 
to see the license and registration card. The officer 
shined his flashlight into the car and noticed cartons 
of cigarette contraband. 'fhe court held that the officers, 
upon observing the contraband, had reasonable grounds 
to believe a crime had been committed and that the 
search was proper. 
In State v. Griffin~ 84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d 
856 ( 1964) , the police approached a motor vehicle to 
warn a motorist of the danger of a certain left turn 
that was not illegal. They asked the motorist for his 
license and, in the course of doing so, observed contra-
band on the back seat of the car. The court stated: 
"The observations of the two police officers 
justified the conclusion that the clothing they 
observed was apparently stolen. The possession 
of stolen property is illegal ; it is the equivalent 
of contraband~ and is subject to seizure. See 17 
C.J.S. Contraband, p .. 510; Williams v. State, 
216 Miss. 158, 61 So.2d 793 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ; 
State v. McKindel, 148 'Vash. 237, 268 P. 593 
(Sup. Ct. 1928) ; State v. IIoffman, 245 Wis. 
367, 14 N.W.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; State 
v. Hawkins, 362 ::\Io. 152, 240 S.,V.2d 688 
(Sup. Ct. 1951). l-Iaving observed the stolen 
property, which was fullr djsclosed and in plain 
view, Investigator \Valker was justified in open-
ing the door of the motor vehicle and physically 
examining the same. The constitutional guaran-
tees of the Fourth Amendment are to protect 
17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
persons against unreasonable searches and seiz .. 
ures. We hold that the search of defendants' 
vehicle and the seizure of the stolen property 
were reasonable under the circumstances of the 
case.'' 
In State v. Brooks, 357 P.2d 735 (Wash. 1961), 
police approached a vehicle in a no-parking zone and, 
during the course of interrogating the driver and while 
asking for the registration for the vehicle, observed 
items on the back seat of the car which appeared to 
be contraband. They then arrested the occupants and 
made a search. The Washington Supreme Court up· 
held the conviction, stating: 
"In the instant case, one of the officers open~d 
the automobile door in order to question the 
appellant regarding the ownership of the auto· 
mobile. This was not a part of an illegal search. 
On the contrary, it was a reasonable course for 
a police officer to take in handling a ease of an 
illegally parked car when someone was sitting 
in it. Once lawfully in that position, the officer 
could observe what was there to be seen. As we 
stated in State v. Llewellyn, supra [119 Wash. 
306, 206 P. 396]: 
'' ' * * * Once in the place, the officers were 
justified in taking cognizance of the fact that 
a crime was being committed by the defend-
ant. The evidence thereof was before their 
very eyes; it took no search to find it. * * * ' 
"The officer saw paper bags with clothing 
consisting of uncuffed pants protruding from 
them while he was in the process of questioning 
the appellant concerning ownership of the auto-
Inobile. As we have above decided, upon this 
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observation, a lawful arrest could have been 
made. Therefore, the search into the paper bags 
and seizure of the contents prior to the arrest 
of the appellant was lawful, and the trial court 
properly denied the motion to suppress this evi-
dence." 
A case reaching- a similar result is, State v. Sullivan~ 
395 P .2d 7 45 (Wash. 1964). 
In Haerr v. United States~ 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 
1957), Border Patrol officers stopped a vehicle to in-
quire of the occupants and observed contraband in 
the vehicle. They subsequently arrested the individuals 
and Seized the contraband. In upholding the search, 
the court observed: 
" * * * Stopping the automobile in quest of 
aliens was the- duty of the Border Patrol, and 
it was a part of the performance of this duty to 
look into the automobile. Mere observation, how-
ever, does not constittue a search. United States, 
v. Lee, 1926, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 
L.Ed. 1202; Ellison v. United States, D.C. Cir. 
1953, 206 F.2d 476; United States v. Strickland, 
D.C.S.C. 1945, 62 F.Supp. 468." 
In United kYtates v. Lee~ 274 U.S. 559 (1926), 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that it was 
perfectly permissible for officers to base an arrest 
upon what they viewed even if the viewing was by 
artificial means. 
In State v. Allred, 16 U.2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 
(1964), this court ruled that where an officer stopped 
a vehicle and observed items taken from a burglary 
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in plain sight, the subsequent arrest and seizure were 
legal. 
In The Federal Law 01-~ Search and Seizure_, F.B.I., 
February 1962, it is stated: 
"In the law on search of vehicles, equally with 
that covering search of places, it is extremely 
important for the law enforcement officer to 
know what is not a search and what is not a seiz-
ure. Knowledge of the first of these will allow 
the officer to judge how far he may go in the 
inspection of a vehicle without having made an 
illegal search which will void all subsequent 
action in the case. For example, if an officer 
making a lawful check of vehicle equipment at 
a road block set up to verify motorists' compli-
ance with safety regulations looks into the back 
seat through any closed or open window and 
sees therein clear evidence of a crime such as 
possession of non-tax paid liquor, he then has 
probable cause to immediately search the vehicle 
for that crime. The officer originally saw the 
evidence of a crime \vithout making a search, 
and once having obtained his probable cause 
lawfully in that manner he may then proceed to 
make a search and take any other action called 
for under the law." 
It is apparent, therefore, that the officer, after 
approaching the vehicle, observed what was a violation 
of a Las Vegas City ordinance and, therefore, the sub-
sequent arrest, and search, were proper. The appel-
lant's argument to the contrary is, at best, a feeble 
gesture, Davis, Jlederal Searches and Seizures_, 349, 
350 (1964). 
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CONCLUSION 
The State's case was proved by strong and direct 
evidence. It is apparent that the jury was clearly con-
vinced from the testimony and exhibits of the appel-
lant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The argument 
that the evidence is insufficient is without merit. 
The jury was properly instructed and only by 
hypercritical challenge could the instructions given be 
said to have been prejudicial. 
The claim of an illegal search and seizure is, at 
best, not addressed to the applicable law and facts. 
Under these circumstances, this Court should 
affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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